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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the link between organizational culture and effectiveness for 
foreign-owned firms operating in Russia.  Beginning with a model of organizational 
culture developed in the USA, the paper presents a multi-method analysis of culture and 
effectiveness in a transition economy.  We argue that effectiveness in Russia relies more 
on adaptability and flexibility than in the USA.  Furthermore, the legacy of the 
communist era forces firms in Russia to deal with a workforce with a unique time 
perspective and a unique set of sub-cultures that often undermine attempts at coordination 
and integration.  We first explore these ideas using survey data on 179 foreign-owned 
firms operating in Russia and compare the results to those obtained for firms in the USA.  
We then present four case studies designed to ground the results in the Russian context, 










Many organizational researchers have examined corporate culture as a source of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1986; Ott, 1989; Pfeffer, 1994; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983), but explicit theories 
are few and empirical evidence is limited (Denison and Mishra, 1995).  The theories that do exist 
(Denison, 1990; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; O’Reilly, 1989) have been developed and applied only in 
the USA.  Scholars focusing on the applicability of American management theories abroad (Adler, 
1991; Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a; 1993; Lammers and Hickson, 1979) have 
asked, “Is organization science, as it is currently conceived, applicable across countries?” and “To 
what extent must organizational theorizing be modified due to national differences?” (Boyacigiller 
et al., 2003: 17). 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by presenting a study of organizational culture 
and effectiveness that focuses on a set of foreign-owned firms operating in Russia.  The study also 
compares the Russian results to results previously obtained in the USA.  Russia merits study for 
several reasons.  Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of territory, it has the 6
th largest 
population, and the 14
th largest GDP (World Bank, 2001).  The legacy of Russia and the USA as 
cold war superpowers gives Russia special importance to global stability.  Furthermore, since 
foreign investment is critically important to Russia’s success as a key transition economy (Denison, 
2001; Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos, 1990), the cultural problems encountered by foreign firms doing 
business in Russia (Elenkov, 1998; Fey, 1995; Fey and Beamish, 2001; Kvint, 1994) seem 
particularly important to address. 
Our paper begins with an overview of the Russian context and its influence on organizational 
culture.  Next, we introduce the model of organizational culture underlying this study and use this 
model to develop a set of research questions.  We then present quantitative findings on the linkage 
between organizational culture and effectiveness based on data from 179 foreign-owned firms 
operating in Russia, and compare these findings to results from the USA.  This quantitative analysis 
is followed by four qualitative case studies, designed to ground the quantitative results in the 
Russian context and to help examine several significant cultural dynamics that were not fully 
represented in the model. 
THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT 
Russia has a well-educated, low-cost labor force and is rich in natural resources.  But Russia 
has not reached its economic potential during its transition to a market economy, partly because few 
outsiders appear to understand how to operate there.  Russia has been plagued by problems such as 2 
organized crime, intractable bureaucracy, and an unstable political and economic system.  Foreign 
firms have increased interest in Russia, but they often encounter cultural problems (Cattaneo, 1992; 
Fey, 1995).  Shekshnia (1998) also suggests that organizational culture is a key determinant of 
success.  As Luthans, Welsh, and Rosenkratz (1993: 742) noted, “The assumptions…are that the 
Russians are failing badly because they know little about modern management techniques and, in 
fact, US and Russian management systems are quite different.  The time has come to assess these 
assumptions.”  Thus, we begin by reviewing the Russian management literature in areas closely 
related to organizational culture:  management practices, work values, and national culture. 
Russian Management Practices.  Historically, Russian decision- making has been very 
centralized with little empowerment.  This pattern was primarily imposed from the top but to some 
degree was also encouraged from below.  Since Russian managers have traditionally been punished 
for negative results, even those beyond their control, they tend to exhibit learned helplessness (Kets 
de Vries, 2000) and a strong desire to want someone else to make decisions.  To counter this 
ingrained problem, it is necessary to create a system of involvement in which employees are 
rewarded for taking initiative and held accountable for their actions, but not punished for 
unpredictable outcomes (Puffer and Shekshnia, 1996).  Other authors (Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos, 
1993; May, Bormann-Young, and Ledgerwood, 1998) also stress the importance of accountability.  
In Russia, being able to blame someone else is often regarded as tantamount to solving a problem. 
HRM practices typically reflect and reinforce national culture and organizational culture.  
One study of 66 Russian managers at the Tver Cotton Mill found that extrinsic rewards and 
behavioral management increased worker performance but that participative techniques resulted in 
decreased performance (Luthans, Welsch, and Rosenkratz, 1993; Welsch, Luthans, and Sommer, 
1993).  Puffer and Shekshnia (1996) argue that individual bonuses should be tied to initiative and 
personal accountability and that firms should organize social events and other group activities with 
workers, provide small-group incentives, and provide a mix of short and long-term incentives.  Fey, 
Engstrom, and Bjorkman (1999) also stress the benefits of using bonuses in Russia.  Russians also 
appear to be highly motivated by development opportunities (Fey and Bjorkman, 2001; May, 
Bormann, Young, and Ledgerwood, 1998; Shekshnia, 1998).  For example, a recent study by Fey 
and Bjorkman (2001) showed that training is highly valued and is linked to firm performance.  
These HRM practices reflect important cultural values regarding empowerment and accountability. 3 
Another recurring theme in the management literature is the poor flow of information.  As 
Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence (1990) have noted, Russian organizations often have good vertical 
flow of information, but poor horizontal flow from department to department.  Information is 
typically seen as power, creating barriers to coordination and integration.  Several authors have 
advocated using teams to achieve coordination since Russians like working in groups and are good 
at doing it (Puffer, 1992; Puffer, McCarthy, and Zhuplev, 1998; Vlachoutsicos, 2001). 
Russian Work Values and National Culture.  Organizational cultures are embedded in and 
shaped by national cultures.  Puffer underscores several differences between Russian and US 
business ethics (Puffer and McCarthy, 1995), noting that giving bribes and ignoring senseless rules 
are more acceptable in Russia than in the USA, while blowing the whistle on fellow workers, having 
large salary differentials, and laying off people are more acceptable in the USA than they would be 
in Russia.  Other authors (Holt, Ralston, and Terpstra, 1994; Ralston, Holt, Terpstra, and Cheng, 
1997) have noted that Russian managers, compared to their American counterparts, value power 
more, need gratification less, and place lower value on tradition and higher value on security and 
stability.  Russians are also said to be less individualistic and less open to change.  Elenkov (1997) 
compared Russia to the USA on Hofstede’s (1980b) four dimensions of national culture.  The table 
below compares Elenkov’s results for Russia to Hofstede’s (1980) results for the USA. 
 
 
  Elenkov (1997)  Hofstede (1980b) 
 Russia  USA 
Individualism 40  91 
Uncertainty Avoidance  87  46 
Masculinity 50  62 
Power Distance  89  40 
 
These results show that Russians are group oriented (Vlachoutsicos, 2001) and prefer to avoid 
uncertainty.  Both might be expected given the social security imprinted by the Communist system 
and the surprises dealt to Russia in the past.  Russians report medium masculinity and appear to 
have a fairly high power distance (the extent to which a society accepts that power in institutions 
and organizations is distributed unequally), reflecting the large social gap that exists between 4 
workers and managers in Russia.  Further understanding of Russian character is offered by the 
famous 19
th century Russian historian Kliuchevskii (1990).  He describes a set of stereotypical 
Russian behaviors including resourcefulness, patience under adversity, deprivation, and spurts of 
energy, combined with a tendency to dissemble and an inconsistency in seeing things through.  He 
also describes Russians as circumspect, cautious, and ambiguous with a preference to look back 
instead of forward.  Finally, he argues that Russians prefer to work in groups and to monitor results 
rather than set goals. 
Although there is no specific Russian management literature on organizational culture and 
effectiveness, this review of the literature on management practices, values, and national culture 
highlights several important issues:  the cultures of Russian organizations exhibit a unique set of 
issues concerned with involvement, empowerment, and accountability, as well as a serious set of 
issues with respect to achieving coordination and strategic direction as Russians adapt to the 
emerging market economy.  These issues are reflected in the approach to culture taken in our study. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
A number of scholars have developed integrative frameworks of organizational culture 
(Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Hatch, 1993; Martin, 1992; Ott, 1989; Schein, 1985, 1990), but little 
consensus exists with regard to a general theory.  Since culture is a complex phenomenon, ranging 
from underlying beliefs and assumptions to visible structures and practices, some observers question 
whether culture can actually be “measured” in a comparative sense.  Research on the link between 
organizational culture and effectiveness is also limited by lack of agreement about the appropriate 
measures of effectiveness. 
The current literature has its roots in the early 1980s.  Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Peters 
and Waterman (1982) focused attention on the strategic importance of organizational culture and 
stimulated interest in the topic.  Kotter and Heskett (1992) expanded on this by exploring the 
importance of adaptability and the fit between an organization and its environment.  This paper 
builds on the framework developed by Denison and his colleagues (Denison, 1984, 1990, 1996; 
Denison and Mishra, 1995, 1998; Denison and Neale, 1996; Denison, Cho, and Young, 2002).  This 
stream of research has developed an explicit model of organizational culture and effectiveness and a 
validated method of measurement.  This model is based on four cultural traits of effective 
organizations, which are described briefly below with references to their grounding in the 
organizational studies literature.  5 
Involvement. Effective organizations empower people, organize around teams, and develop 
human capability (Becker, 1964; Lawler, 1996; Likert, 1961).  Executives, managers, and 
employees are committed and feel a strong sense of ownership.  People at all levels feel that 
they have input into decisions that will affect their work and see a direct connection to the 
goals of the organization (Katzenbach, 1993; Spreitzer, 1995). 
 
Consistency. Effective organizations tend to have “strong” cultures that are highly 
consistent, well coordinated, and well integrated (Davenport, 1993; Saffold, 1988).  
Behavioral norms are rooted in core values, and leaders and followers are able to reach 
agreement even with diverse points of view (Block, 1991). Consistency is a source of 
stability and internal integration resulting from a common mindset (Senge, 1990). 
 
Adaptability. Ironically, organizations that are well integrated are often the least responsive 
(Kanter, 1983). Internal integration and external adaptation can often be at odds.  Adaptable 
organizations are driven by their customers, take risks and learn from their mistakes, and 
have capability and experience at creating change (Nadler, 1998; Senge, 1990; Stalk, 1988). 
 
Mission. Effective organizations have a clear sense of purpose and direction defining goals 
and strategic objectives and expressing a vision of the future (Mintzberg, 1987, 1994; 
Ohmae, 1982; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). When an organization’s underlying mission 
changes, changes also occur in other aspects of the organization’s culture. 
 
Applying this framework to top executives in 764 organizations, Denison and Mishra (1995) 
showed that four different cultural traits were related to several criteria of effectiveness.  This 
research found that profitability was most highly correlated with the traits of mission and 
consistency.  In contrast, innovation was most highly associated with the traits of involvement and 
adaptability, and sales growth was most highly associated with the traits of adaptability and mission.  
Like many contemporary models of organizational effectiveness, this model focuses on the 
contradictions involved in simultaneously achieving internal integration and external adaptation 
(Hatch, 1993; Schein, 1990).  For example, organizations that are market-focused and opportunistic 
often have problems with internal integration.  On the other hand, organizations that are well-
integrated and over-controlled usually have a hard time adapting to their environments.  
Organizations with a top-down vision often find it difficult to focus on the empowerment and the 
“bottom-up” dynamics needed for alignment.  At the same time, organizations fostering broad 
participation often have difficulty establishing direction.  Effective organizations are those that are 
able to resolve these contradictions without relying on simple trade-offs. 
At the core of this model are underlying beliefs and assumptions. These “deeper” levels of 
organizational culture are typically difficult to measure and harder to generalize about.  However, 6 
these underlying beliefs and assumptions result in organizational practices which are observable and 
which are represented by the four key traits of involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission 
presented in Figure 1.  This model incorporates many of the concepts identified in our review of the 
Russian management literature and thus serves as a useful framework for our study. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
This study took a unique approach to applying this model in the Russian context.  The model 
was used as a framework to test the idea that organizational culture influences effectiveness, but the 
model was also used as a reference point for understanding aspects of the culture of Russian 
organizations that may not have been well represented in the model.  The first part of this study 
presents a quantitative test of the model examining the relationship between culture and 
effectiveness.  The second part of this study then presents four case studies to ground the concepts. 
In contrast to the typical approach of qualitative theory building followed by quantitative 
theory testing, the two parts of this study were conducted in tandem.  As such, this study took 
several risks.  For example, if the quantitative study had not supported the usefulness of the model 
for understanding culture and effectiveness in the Russian context, then it would have made little 
sense to use the model as a framework for the qualitative research.  Using two approaches 
simultaneously allowed us to go back and forth between them to gain a better understanding of what 
was “behind the numbers” and to develop a better picture of areas where the concepts had a different 
meaning in Russia than in the USA. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions guiding this investigation concern the applicability of the model in 
Russia, differences in the link between culture and effectiveness in Russia and the USA, and the 
underlying meaning and applicability of these concepts in Russia.  The first two questions are 
examined through a quantitative study of 179 firms, and the third research question through four 
qualitative case studies. 
As noted earlier, there is good support in the literature for the importance of the four cultural 
traits in the model.  However, these findings are based upon samples of firms in the USA.  Since 
many authors have suggested that national culture is likely to influence the way management theory 
“works” outside of the USA (e.g., Adler, 1991; Boyacigiller et al., 2003; Boyacigiller and Adler, 7 
1991; Hofstede, 1993; Hofstede, 1980a, 1980b), we first need to determine if a link exists between 
the four traits and effectiveness in Russia. 
Research Question #1: To what extent are involvement, consistency, adaptability, and 
mission associated with the effectiveness of firms in Russia? 
Past research has shown that different cultural traits are related to different criteria of 
effectiveness (Denison and Mishra, 1995; Cameron and Whetten, 1983; Pennings, 1976).  However, 
differences in national culture may influence the specific impact that the four traits have in Russia.  
Since the US is more individualistic, but Russians dislike uncertainty more and have greater power 
distance (Hofstede 1980a; Elenkov 1997), we might expect that involvement would be more 
important in the Russian context.  In addition, since the beginning of Perestroika in 1987, the 
business environment in Russia has been turbulent and unpredictable (Holt, Ralston, and Terpstra, 
1994; Puffer, McCarthy, and Zhuplev, 1998).  As a result, adaptability is likely to be particularly 
important for firms operating in Russia.  In contrast, mission and consistency, which are likely to be 
more important in a stable country like the USA, may be less important in Russia. 
Research Question #2: What is the specific pattern between the four traits and various 
criteria of effectiveness in Russia?  How does the pattern in Russia differ from the pattern in 
the USA?  Do the traits of adaptability and involvement have a stronger impact in Russia 
than they do in the USA? 
Even if the first two research questions receive good quantitative support from the 
comparative study, numbers cannot tell the whole story.  This is particularly true in cross-cultural 
research.  For example, in the USA when someone nods his or her head up and down, it means 
“yes”.  However, the same action in Bulgaria means “no.”  The same action has exactly the opposite 
meaning in the two countries!  Our case studies are used to address three main issues: First, they 
point out patterns of behaviors that reflect the concepts in the model and resemble patterns observed 
in the USA.  Second, we use the case studies to describe patterns of behavior that fit with the 
concepts but are very different from patterns in the USA.  Third, our case studies help us to 
highlight some of the underlying dynamics that help to explain these differences.  These qualitative 
case studies help point out areas where the concepts in the model travel fairly well, but also identify 
specific patterns of behavior and underlying dynamics that may be quite different in Russia.  Thus, 
our third research question takes a look at what is behind the numbers. 
Research Question #3: What are the patterns of behavior that illustrate the concepts in the 
model in Russia?  Which patterns of behavior are similar to those that might be observed in 
the USA?  Which patterns of behavior are different from those that might be observed in the 8 
USA?  What are some of the underlying forces that drive these different patterns of 
behavior? 
These three research questions are examined using two linked studies: The first two 
questions are examined in a comparative study of 179 firms, while the third question is examined 
through a set of four case studies. 
TESTING THE MODEL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
This section of the paper presents the quantitative results from a survey of 179 foreign firms 
operating in Russia.  This first part of the research examines the impact of organizational culture on 
effectiveness in Russia and then compares those results to similar results from a sample of firms 
from the USA. 
Methodology 
The population for this study included all foreign firms operating in Russia in October 1997 
with a parent firm headquartered in Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Sweden, or the USA.  We 
combined lists of firms from each country’s embassy for a total of 789 firms.  478 of the firms met 
our criteria of having at least 15 employees in Russia, operating before June 1995, and being located 
in Moscow or St. Petersburg.  We chose to focus on foreign-owned firms for several reasons: 
Foreign-owned firms in many ways serve as a “bridge” between local and global firms.  If the model 
does not apply to foreign-owned firms, it seems unlikely that it would apply to indigenous firms.  
Foreign-owned firms also tend to experiment more as they try to find a way to survive and prosper.  
Finally, the success of foreign-owned firms is necessary to ensure the continued investment of 
foreign capital. 
Data collection occurred between October 1997 and January 1998. After calling to confirm 
that the company met the sampling criteria, we personally delivered a questionnaire to the firm for a 
senior manager to complete.  Whenever possible, the researcher described the project and had the 
manager complete the questionnaire at that time.  However, sometimes the manager opted to 
complete the questionnaire later and return it by fax.  If questionnaires were not received within one 
week, we began a follow-up procedure including three telephone calls, faxing another questionnaire, 
and a fourth telephone call as a final reminder.  Companies whose questionnaires had not been 
returned by the end of this procedure were considered non-respondents. 
This procedure yielded 179 usable questionnaires completed by a senior manager in each 
firm, for a 37% response rate.  Respondents were either general managers or deputy general 9 
mangers (80%) or human resource mangers (20%).  122 were Russian and 57 were foreign.  
Position of the respondent was initially included in the regression equations but proved non-
significant and was dropped from subsequent analyses to preserve degrees of freedom.  We 
confirmed that the mean size of responding firms was virtually identical to the population mean for 
foreign subsidiaries in Russia
1(Goskomstat, 1998).  Using a single respondent to depict a firm’s 
culture has several limitations.  It would, of course, be much better to have a large sample of 
respondents from each firm or in-depth case studies of each of the 179 firms.  However, that would 
require a huge investment of resources.  Because of the comparative focus of the first part of this 
study, we opted for the approach that would result in as large a sample of firms as possible.  Single 
respondent studies are also quite common in the recent organizational and strategy literature (e.g., 
Birkinshaw, Hood, and Johnson, 1998; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Delery and Doty, 1996; Denison 
and Mishra, 1995; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Lee and Beamish, 1995; Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, and 
Gupta, 1998).  A comparative citation analysis shows that single-respondent studies published in top 
journals are cited frequently
2, suggesting that when properly executed, their results are accepted.  
Some readers may also be concerned that gathering data from a single executive respondent 
may lead to common method bias.  However, using a similar set of measures, Denison and Mishra 
(1995) showed that culture measures correlated more highly with objectively measured effectiveness 
than with perceptual measures of effectiveness.  Given the well-known dominance of most directors 
of firms in Russia, we would also argue that it is more accurate to use the general director or deputy 
general director as a sole respondent in Russia than it might be in other countries.  In any case, Fey 
(1997) has shown that respondents in different parts and levels of an organization tend to have 
similar assessments of an organization’s culture. 
Survey items drawn from the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (Denison and Mishra, 
1995; Denison and Neale, 1996; Denison, Cho, and Young, 2002) and were translated into Russian 
and back into English, checked by Russian experts, and pilot tested.  The four traits in the model 
each have three indexes that are the mean of three five-point Likert scale questions ranging from 1-5 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree).  Appendix A includes a complete list of all these items. 
Following Denison and Mishra (1995), effectiveness was measured using seven five-point 
Likert items, ranging from 1=poor to 5=excellent.  These items included overall performance
3, 
market share, sales growth, profitability, employee satisfaction, quality of products and services, and 
new product development.  These six specific effectiveness measures yielded a one-factor solution 10 
which we labeled the effectiveness index (alpha=.84).  While some scholars have criticized the use 
of subjective measures of effectiveness, we found them useful for several reasons.  First, since 
Russian accounting standards are still emerging, it is nearly impossible to obtain comparable 
financial data.  Second, since firms operating in Russia have such diverse goals, comparing their 
short-term financial performance makes little sense.  Third, virtually no centrally collected financial 
information is available.  Finally, Russians are often secretive and unwilling to share financial 
information. Thus, in Russia the benefits of using subjective measures far outweigh the drawbacks.  
Furthermore, there is good precedent for using perceptual measures (Delaney and Huselid, 1996; 
Denison and Mishra, 1995), and prior research has shown that subjective measures of performance 
correlate well with objective measures of performance (Powell, 1992). 
We also included control variables for size, industry, firm age, country of origin, and 
nationality of the respondent.  We measured firm size as the number of employees and controlled for 
concentration in manufacturing.  Firm age has little variance since foreign firms were not allowed 
into Russia prior to 1987.  We also controlled for industry, using six the SIC-based categories 
prevalent in our sample: 
1.  Electrical, industrial, and precision instrument manufacturing 
2.  Wood, paper, textiles, food, and metal manufacturing 
3.  All other manufacturing 
4.  Banking, insurance, real estate, advertising, and accounting 
5.  Wholesale and retail trade 
6.  Other services 
Finally, we included dummy variables to control for the influence of the home country of the 
parent firm and to separate Russian and non-Russian respondents.  The US comparison sample used 
in this study comes from Denison, Cho, and Young (2002) and includes 36,542 respondents from 94 
firms from the USA.  For this sample there are > 25 respondents from each firm.  Responses were 
aggregated at the firm level before conducting the analyses.  Intra-organizational response rates 
ranged from 48% to 100%.  Surveys were completed by a wide variety of respondents in the 
different organizations.  The surveys were completed between 1997 and 1999 and cover a wide 
variety of industries.  Tests for industry effects revealed no significant industry effects on the 
relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness and thus controls for industry were 
dropped to preserve degrees of freedom. 11 
Results 
The validity of the Russian culture measures is supported by the factor analysis presented in 
Table 1.  The data factor nicely into four dimensions with relatively low cross loadings and all of the 
Cronbach alphas are greater than .70.  Thus, the factor analysis demonstrates good convergent and 
discriminant validity. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 addresses the issues raised in Research Question 1, and offers support for the model.  
All four of the model’s cultural traits are associated with perceptions of organizational effectiveness 
in the 179-firm Russian sample:  31 of 32 correlations among the various dimensions of 
organizational culture and effectiveness reached statistical significance.  To compare US and 
Russian managers as proposed in Research Question 2, Table 2 reports correlations from a sample 
of 94 US firms (Denison, Cho, and Young, 2002). This comparison shows that all four cultural 
dimensions in the Russian data are less highly correlated with overall performance, employee 
satisfaction, quality, and product development, than was the case in the USA.  On the other hand, in 
the Russian data the cultural traits correlate more highlywith market share, sales growth, 
profitability, and the effectiveness index.   
In Russia, adaptability and involvement are the strongest correlates of the effectiveness index, 
overall performance, profitability, and product development; involvement and mission are the 
strongest correlates of market share, sales growth, employee satisfaction, and quality.  This pattern 
contrasts with the US results which show that mission correlates most highly with five of eight 
effectiveness dimensions. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
A more definitive look at the relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness is 
provided by the regression results.  Table 3 reports the Russian results.  It shows  that the control 
variables are insignificant, with two minor exceptions:  (1) firms in the electrical, industrial, and 
instrument manufacturing sector are slightly less profitable, (2) larger firms tend to receive 
somewhat higher quality ratings.  Table 3 shows that all of the culture traits except consistency are 
significant predictors of some aspect of effectiveness, providing substantial support for the firsIt 
research question.  The results also support the idea that different aspects of culture are linked to 
different elements of effectiveness.  For example, Table 3 shows that sales growth is most highly 
associated with mission and that profitability is most highly associated with adaptability.  Finally, 12 
Table 3 shows that involvement is the most important dimension of organizational culture for firms 
whose primary goal is employee satisfaction. A correlation matrix of the variables used in the 
regression analyses is presented in Appendix B.
4 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
Overall, adaptability and involvement seem to be the most important determinants of 
effectiveness in the Russian context.  They account for 12 of the 15 significant relationships 
associated with effectiveness and are also the most significant in the effectiveness and overall 
performance models.  These results contrast with the regression results for the US data which are 
presented in Table 4.  In the USA mission is the organizational cultural trait most highly associated 
with effectiveness as it is significantly associated with five of the eight effectiveness measures.  
Involvement is also significantly associated with employee satisfaction and the overall effectiveness 
index.  Thus, involvement appears to be important for creating an effective organization in both the 
USA and Russia.  However, mission appears the most important trait in the relatively stable USA 
while in Russia’s transition economy, adaptability is the more important factor.  The observation 
that different organizational cultural traits are more important in the USA and Russia addresses 
Research Question 2.   
These comparative results are quite encouraging.  The culture measures achieved a high 
level of validity, showing that comparative cross-national research on culture and effectiveness is 
quite possible.  The correlation and regression results show many important similarities to the results 
from prior research from the USA, but present one important difference: In Russia’s turbulent 
transition economy, stability traits such as mission and consistency are less strongly associated with 
effectiveness than are the flexibility traits of involvement and adaptability.  The results also make 
good intuitive sense and encourage us to turn our attention to what lies behind the numbers. 
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK: FOUR CASE STUDIES 
The quantitative part of this study shows that many of the concepts in the organizational 
culture model appear to have an impact in the Russian context.  But even where the results appear to 
indicate a similar impact in the US and Russia, it could be a mistake to assume that the concepts 
have the same meaning in the Russian context as they do in the US environment.  For example, 
empowerment may be important in both contexts, but empowerment may entail very different 
behaviors in the two contexts.  Thus, the first objective of the case studies is to ground the model in 13 
the Russian context through more detailed description.  The second objective is to highlight aspects 
of the cultures of these firms that have an important impact on effectiveness but are difficult to 
describe using only the concepts in the model.  This section begins with a description of the case 
study methodology, followed by background descriptions of the four firms and a summary table.  
Next, we ground the concepts of the model in the reality of the cases.  The final part of this section 
focuses on several key themes that emerged from the case studies that were not well represented in 
the model but help to provide a better understanding of culture and effectiveness in the Russian 
context. 
Case Study Methods 
We began by identifying a subset of the 179 firms that had at least 70 employees and had 
manufacturing and sales operations in Russia.  To control for the national culture of the parent firm 
and to facilitate access, we identified 13 Swedish firms that met these criteria and selected four firms 
representing a range of effectiveness levels (Eisenhardt, 1989).  We then conducted 10 interviews in 
each firm.  In each case, we interviewed one expatriate (either the GM or Deputy GM) and 
conducted the remaining interviews with Russians.  In each firm, we interviewed the GM, the HR 
Manager, two production employees, one production manager, one marketing employee, one 
marketing manager, one financial or accounting employee, one engineer, and one engineering 
manager.  Sixty percent of the interviews were conducted in English and the rest in Russian with a 
translator present.  The interviews were semi-structured, following Merton, Fiske, and Kendall’s 
(1963) approach.  The core questions focused on the following topics: the interviewee’s background, 
the organization’s values, the unique aspects of the organization’s history, the sub-groups in the 
firm, the organization’s management and business practices, and the link between the organization’s 
culture and effectiveness.  The purpose of these interviews was to understand the organization and 
the impact that it’s culture had on effectiveness. 
Two researchers were present at each interview.  Both took notes independently and typed 
them up each night.  Any inconsistencies were discussed and resolved.  Researchers’ impressions 
were kept separate from the interviewees’ impressions, and all data were included in the write-ups 
even when not specifically requested in the interview guide (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Interview notes from the two researchers were compared to highlight differences and produce a 
master set of interview notes.  Next we followed the “memoing” process (Glaser, 1978), to record 14 
patterns that the researchers noted within each site and across sites to identify the matches between 
the empirical pattern and the predicted pattern (Yin, 1984). 
Our presentation of the case studies begins with brief background descriptions of each firm.  
This is followed by a discussion of the cases in terms of the four traits defined by the model, 
illustrating them with examples from the cases.  The final section focuses on several key themes that 
emerged from the case studies that were not well represented by the model but are important for 
understanding firms in Russia. 
Four Case Studies: General Background 
AGA.  Headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, AGA is one of the world’s leading producers 
of industrial gas (e.g., oxygen, hydrogen, argon) with 1999 sales of US$1.76 billion and over 
10,000 employees in 40 countries.  AGA has a matrix structure with three business areas 
(manufacturing industry, process industry, and health care industry) and country 
organizations. 
 
AGA entered Russia in 1908.  After an interruption during the 1917 revolution, AGA began 
supplying the Russian market via its Finnish subsidiaries in 1934.  In 1999, AGA Russia 
employed over 350 people with a head office in Moscow, a sales office in St. Petersburg and 
factories in Kaliningrad and Moscow.  AGA Moscow experienced financial losses in Russia 
in 1997 and 1998, but cut expenses in 1999 and thus made a small profit even though their 
prices are high and the industry has overcapacity. 
 
In 1995, AGA Moscow invested US$10 million in a plant with a capacity of 100 tons per 
day.  The “new” factory was an old AGA factory from Finland that was disassembled, 
shipped to Russia, and then reassembled in Balashikha, just outside of Moscow.  AGA 
Moscow also set up 20 distribution stations throughout Russia.  The Moscow office in 
Balashikha is divided into the sales department, mainly made up of new personnel, and the 
production side, mostly comprised of workers from the acquired production facility. 
 
Alfa Laval.  Alfa Laval produces dairy equipment for separating milk and cream, as well as 
heat exchangers.  It has 13,800 employees in 110 subsidiaries in 50 countries producing 
annual revenues of US$1.8 billion.  Alfa Laval acquired the Potok factory outside Moscow 
in 1993 and renovated it to create a modern-looking factory in 1996.  Today, with 300 
employees, the factory is somewhat too large for Alfa Laval Potok’s current needs. 
 
Alfa Laval Potok has 20 distributors in different regions of Russia.  In Novosibirsk, Alfa 
Laval Potok has a successful distributor covering most of Siberia and accounting for 50 
percent of the total Alfa Laval Potok heating revenues.  Alfa Laval Potok had poor initial 
results and many challenges to overcome.  However, it appears that Alfa Laval has adapted 
well to the Russian environment, making its first profit in 1999.  Alfa Laval Potok was 
originally supposed to focus on producing separation equipment, but this market had over-
capacity.  As a result, Alfa Laval Potok switched the majority of its efforts to producing heat 
exchange equipment for district heating which was a more promising business.  This move 15 
took courage on their part and shows a good ability to adapt to the Russian market.  Alfa 
Laval’s efforts to switch its focus to heat exchangers, trim excess personnel and assets, and 
aggressively pursue sales explain why it is now profitable. 
 
AssiDoman.  The Swedish firm AssiDoman is one of Europe’s largest forest-product 
companies with 18,000 employees and sales of US$3 billion, 60 percent from outside 
Sweden.  AssiDoman is divided into 5 business areas: forestry, packaging, craft products, 
cartons, and barrier coating.  It first entered Russia when it acquired 57 percent of the paper-
producing company Segezhabumprom in Karilea.  This company ran into serious problems, 
and AssiDoman has only recently managed to liquidate this investment. 
 
Nonetheless, AssiDoman still saw opportunity in the Russian market and invested US$25 
million to open a new factory in St. Petersburg in 1997.  This modern factory focuses on the 
production and sales of corrugated packaging in northwestern Russia.  Russian native Dennis 
Belkovsky (Managing Director) and his Danish wife Malene Ratajczak (Finance and 
Administration Director) manage the plant with an enlightened management style.  
According to AssiDoman, the Russian market for corrugated cardboard is growing rapidly.  
Its factory, which covers 15,000m
2, is capable of producing 60 million m
2 of cardboard per 
year when working three shifts.  Currently, however, only one shift, with 80 employees is 
working. 
 
Lift.  Lift (a pseudonym) is a division of a large global firm that develops, produces, sells, 
and services elevators.  The parent company has 200,000 people, sales of US$22 billion, and 
is organized in a matrix structure with national companies in one dimension and 30 business 
areas in the other dimension.  Lift Moscow is a joint venture formed in 1994.  Lift owns 80% 
of Lift Moscow and the Moscow Mechanical Complex , the remaining 20%.  In practice, Lift 
Moscow functions like a wholly owned subsidiary.  Lift Moscow was supposed to be Lift’s 
golden door to Russia, but its potential has not been reached since it has been unable to sell 
many elevators.  Fortunately, it has been able to adapt by cutting the work force from 550 to 
350 employees and by aggressively pursuing service contracts. 
 
Since Lift Moscow produces only small elevators designed for residential use, local 
governments, who have limited resources, are their primary customers.  Lift has had great 
difficulty selling elevators for cash and has resorted to barter.  For example, in one recent 
deal, Lift “sold” a US$1.2 million elevator system to a town.  The town paid for the system 
by bartering US$1.15 million in electricity to a pulp and paper company, that bartered 
US$1.1 million in paper to a trading company that paid Lift US$1 million cash.  Many 
foreign firms refuse to consider barter deals even though they can be an effective way of 
doing business in Russia.  Indeed, barter deals have several drawbacks  -- they take much 
longer and require a 20% mark-up to be profitable.  However, they allow firms to make sales 
that would not otherwise be possible.  The use of barter deals and the focus on service are 
two key examples of how Lift has adapted. 
Grounding the Model in the Russian Context 
To summarize the case studies, we present several ratings of the culture and effectiveness 
measures.  The researchers’ assessments, the survey evaluation of the GM, and the survey 16 
evaluation of the ten interviewees are all presented in Table 5.  These results show that the different 
assessments are quite consistent. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Each of these cases provides examples that help ground the model in the Russian context.  
Some of the examples show direct similarities to firms in a Western context, while other examples 
appear to illustrate the general concepts outlined in the model, but show many differences from 
firms in the West.  This section presents our qualitative findings. 
Involvement.  Several of the cases provide examples of involvement similar to what might 
be found in the West, while other examples provide a very different feel.  For example, the 
AssiDoman production manager rewarded workers who could operate multiple machines and put a 
chart on the wall where workers could see how many machines they were certified to operate.  
Nonetheless, strong leaders who exert tight control are an enduring Russian tradition and the overall 
level of involvement seems quite a bit lower than would likely be the case in the West.  For 
example, the same production manager who rewarded workers for mastering multiple machines 
exerted very tight control over workers and would not allow them to make personal calls home, even 
if they had a sick child.  Workers also complained that management often made them clean their 
aging machinery over and over again when work was slow.  Nonetheless, workers still appear to 
place high value on capability development.  In this same organization, when workers were asked if 
they would prefer an extra month’s pay or the chance to attend a one-week training course, most 
said that they would choose the training course.  This is consistent with assertions that Russians may 
attach higher value to development than their counterparts in the West (Puffer, 1992). 
Other examples of involvement appear to be more unique to Russia. Top management at 
Alfa Laval would often delegate decisions to middle management.  However, because top 
management had an “open-door” policy, the middle managers would come back over and over again 
asking top management to “decide” on an issue that had officially been delegated to them.  Top 
management would respond by asking for the pros and cons of different alternatives but, in the end, 
tried to make the middle managers decide.  Top management thought that this was better than 
abruptly telling middle management that it was their job to decide.  Over time the middle managers 
slowly learned to make decisions on delegated issues.  Alfa Laval, in fact, was probably the best 
example of high involvement among the four case studies. 17 
AGA provides a useful example of how expectations of involvement and the sense of 
belonging to a team often follow functional lines.  AGA had two very different subcultures.  People 
in the top management, sales, and accounting departments were young, new to the firm, highly 
motivated, and open to trying new ways of working.  People in the production department were 
older and had been working at the plant for many years.  This second group of employees primarily 
wanted stable jobs with salaries they could live on and were not eager to change the way they had 
worked for years.  Both groups were motivated by membership in their functional sub-groups but 
not by their membership in the organization as a whole.  While this general phenomenon occurs in 
firms in the West, it was clearly more extreme in AGA.  For example, the first time we interviewed 
two factory workers, we asked, “How does it feel to work for AGA?”  They replied, “We don’t 
work for AGA.”  Further questioning revealed that what they meant was that they worked for the 
Balashikha plant and regarded AGA as only an investor.  The management/sales/accounting group 
viewed the production workers as ineffective employees that they inherited with the plant, many of 
whom wanted their salaries without having to work hard.  However, the factory employees saw the 
management group’s high salaries and fancy offices as a major problem that was preventing AGA 
from being profitable.  “After all,” one of the production workers commented, “the sales employees 
cost money, but they are not really producing anything.” 
Consistency.  Several of the cases illustrate aspects of the cultural trait consistency that 
parallel observations made in firms in the West.  The AGA and Alfa Laval cases reveal serious 
problems with coordination and integration stemming from the differing mindsets across functions 
and the poor communication between departments.   
Coordination and communication problems are, of course, also common within firms in the 
West.  However, the cases suggest that the scale and scope of these deficiencies are substantially 
greater in Russia. For example, we asked questions about each firm’s core values.  In Lift, several of 
the employees gave the same answer, “The core value of the firm is to maintain the formal system.”  
Their response does point to a consistent set of core values, but shows that they think that the 
primary purpose of the firm is to maintain the integrity of the authority structure – not a response 
that an employee in the West would often give.  Another example illustrating both the applicability 
of the general concept and the idiosyncrasy of its application in Russia came from AGA.  When we 
asked one lower-level employee whether he agreed with management’s decisions, he replied, “Right 
now, people really have no choice other than to agree.”  This comment shows the relevance of the 18 
general concept of alignment and consensus across levels, but also illustrates the different 
connotation attached to “agreeing” in Russia. 
Adaptability.  The case studies illustrate a number of aspects of adaptability.  The data 
reflect certain dynamics similar to those in Western organizations, while others are quite different.  
AssiDoman’s use of two-person sales teams provides an example paralleling what might be found in 
the West.  To respond more quickly to customers, AssiDoman paired one salesperson on the road 
with another salesperson in the office.  This assured that customers would be able to contact 
someone even when their sales representative was on the road.  The pairing was also helpful in that 
the salesperson on the road could rely upon his or her partner in the office to make certain that 
orders were placed with the production department on a timely basis.  Although one salesperson 
with a laptop and cell phone would probably do this job in the West, the example shows how a small 
team with shared responsibility can make the system respond more quickly to customers. 
Other examples of adaptability that are more specific to the Russian context came from Alfa 
Laval and Lift.  In an effort to survive, Alfa Laval quickly changed its focus from separation 
equipment to heat exchangers.  In Lift, the original focus on producing and selling new elevators in 
Russia was expanded to also include  servicing existing elevators.  Servicing existing elevators 
became the main part of Lift’s business.  The few new elevators that Lift was able to “sell” were 
often arranged through barter.  Drastic strategic changes of this sort may occur as a part of 
restructuring in the West, but in the Russian context they are clearly a more routine aspect of 
“business-as-usual.”  This underscores the importance of adaptability as a concept, even if it takes a 
different form in the Russian context.  Russian firms’ approaches to creating change are also 
instructive.  On one hand, Russians appear to be able to endure change of almost any sort, sustained 
by their combination of resignation, fatalism, and ingenuity in the service of survival.  On the other 
hand, their concept of a proactive approach to change in which individuals shape their own future 
appears quite limited.  It is noteworthy that the most adaptable firm, AssiDoman, used an “open-to-
change” mindset as a key criterion in the recruitment of new employees. 
Mission.  Because of the continuous state of turbulence in the Russian business environment, 
a clear sense of mission is difficult to establish.  Thus, with few exceptions, the positive examples in 
our case studies had to do with the way that drastic organizational changes were communicated to 
employees.  For example, the two least effective organizations, Lift and AGA, both changed 
direction quickly, but did little to communicate these changes to their employees.  In Lift’s case, the 19 
change from production, sales, and service to only service was not communicated throughout the 
organization.  Changes were simply made on the operational level, and employees were expected to 
follow.  In AGA’s case, a series of unmet sales targets quickly changed its strategic goals from 
expansion to survival.  But employees seemed largely unaware of the rationale for these changes.  
Two other cases, Alfa Laval and AssiDoman, illustrate the use of mission to foment change.  In Alfa 
Laval, the strategic rationale for the shift from separation equipment to heat exchangers was well 
communicated and well understood throughout the firm.  In AssiDoman, we saw one of the few 
examples of creating a proactive sense of mission.  The subsidiary was led by a husband and wife 
team who made a deliberate attempt to create an organization that was, in their words, “a good place 
to work.”  Their success in communicating this mission was evident in a number of their employees’ 
comments in interviews. 
Our analysis of the data from these four case studies also supported the quantitative findings 
in another important way.  Our informants provided many more examples of the impact of 
adaptability and involvement on a firm’s effectiveness than of consistency and mission, which 
appeared to be far less powerful determinants of effectiveness in the Russian context.  Comments 
relating to involvement and adaptability also contained many examples of creative solutions to 
problems posed by the Russian context.  Our queries about consistency and mission elicited some 
interesting examples, but these cultural traits clearly are less salient in the turbulent Russian business 
environment.  Thus, the results of the case studies mirror the quantitative findings. 
Understanding Organizational Culture in the Russian Context 
In the previous section, the qualitative results reported for each of the four traits fell into two 
different categories: a) qualitative findings that fit well with the concepts in the model and were 
illustrated through patterns similar to what one might encounter in the West, and b) qualitative 
findings that fit reasonably well with concepts in the model, but felt quite different from the patterns 
typically encountered in Western firms.  This section of the paper takes this analysis one step further 
and focuses on several cultural dynamics that are not as well represented in the model and are quite 
different from the conditions typically encountered by Western firms.   
First, it is important to acknowledge the influence of the Communist era on the culture of 
firms in Russia.  Like firms in most transition economies, our case study firms were “functionally 
incomplete” (Newman and Nollen, 1998).  During the Communist era, the functions of strategy, 
finance, sales, and marketing were primarily performed by the State.  Thus, one of the major 20 
transitions has been to establish these functions at the firm level.  From a cultural point of view, 
these changes often feel more like a merger or acquisition (of the new functions) than like cross-
functional differences in the West.  They influence all aspects of firm operation that require cross-
functional coordination.  Second, the tradition of central control and authority means that the 
salience of any conception of the firm or the value chain is weak or non-existent compared to the 
power of the functional boss.  Russians often regard firm-level goals as distant and unfamiliar 
priorities compared to maintaining the integrity of one’s functional area. 
This pattern is clear in several of the cases.  Indeed, one of our first impressions of AGA was 
of the co-existence of two separate worlds.  The top management and the sales and accounting 
departments make up one world, while the manufacturing department makes up another.  Most 
employees in the former group were young, ambitious, and new to the firm, while the second group 
was older and had worked at the factory for years.  The first group was housed in a separate building 
that was much nicer than the factory building.  Communication between the two groups was limited.   
A similar picture comes from Alfa Laval.  Several top managers were Swedish, with poor 
knowledge of Russian.  They tended to work with younger English-speaking Russians.  The 
language barrier created an “us” versus “them” feeling and undermined team spirit.  “Us” referred to 
the people on the fourth floor, who speak good English, are new at the production plant, and perhaps 
worked at Alfa Laval’s sales subsidiary prior to the acquisition of the factory.  “Them” referred to 
the older managers from Potok with limited knowledge of English, located on the third floor.  
One employee at the Potok plant told us about the difficulty he had understanding the Alfa 
Laval culture.  Prior to Alfa Laval’s acquisition of Potok, meetings were very formal with chairs 
assigned according to position.  Now, Alfa Laval Potok employees are encouraged to work together 
as equals to try to solve problems.  This is difficult for older managers.  To them, communication 
between people of different levels is unnatural.  To learn the new style, the old managers went to 
Sweden for a week to see the new management style in action.  As one participant said, “I 
understood right then how work was to be done.  It is like the old Russian proverb that says it is 
better to see something once than to hear it one hundred times.” In Lift, we saw a picture of 
authority distribution that was more traditional in Russia.  When we asked one manager if workers 
could suggest product modifications he answered, “You don’t understand: Workers work; managers 
know everything.” 21 
These examples illustrate a difficult challenge faced by firms in the Russia.  Many firms, in 
effect, have two workforces.  The first consists of older workers with a traditional Russian mindset 
who resist change.  They are primarily found in production and engineering where there is no 
substitute for their technical expertise.  The second workforce is made up of young, aggressive 
“New Russians” who are generally eager to adapt.  Members of this group are driven by career 
ambitions and often have some training in business, English, or a few years experience working for 
a foreign firm in sales or marketing.  It also appears to be a common pattern to place younger 
workers in charge of older ones early in their careers, adding to the tension. 
The impacts of subcultures are well established in the organizational research literature 
(Hatch, 1993; Martin, 1992; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984), and provide one point of reference for 
understanding these dynamics.  Indeed, one shortcoming of the culture model used here, like other 
general models (Hofstede, 1991; Kotter and Heskett, 1992), is that it can foster the impression that 
organizations have unitary cultures.  Researchers using these approaches need to be aware of the 
subcultures that exist and the dynamics they create.  Kliuchevskii’s (1990: 58-64) comments on the 
Russian “tendency to dissemble,” “preference for working in groups,” and “circumspect nature” 
highlight elements of Russia’s national culture that may help give rise to organizational subcultures. 
Another example from AGA helped clarify the impact that these dynamics can have on 
effectiveness.  When we visited the factory we noticed a bottleneck which seemed to be caused by 
operating only one forklift despite three others parked nearby.  We learned that the forklifts had 
been purchased three months ago, but three of them had been idle for the last five weeks with 
broken sparkplugs.  We traced this problem through the system:  The operators said that they had 
informed  their supervisors of the problem.  The supervisors told us that they had reported the 
problem to the repair center.  The repair center director told us that those sparkplugs were difficult 
to get in Russia and had been ordered from Germany.  Each person felt that he had done his job and 
that there was nothing to do but wait for the sparkplugs to appear.  While the workers were upset 
that they did not have three of their four forklifts, no one took the initiative to ensure that the 
sparkplugs would arrive faster.  Further, no one seemed upset that a major investment in the forklifts 
was going to waste and that workers’ time was being used inefficiently.  In reality, a phone call to 
Germany probably could have had a box of sparkplugs delivered FedEx to Moscow in a few days.  
Top managers at AGA Russia were unaware of this problem and would have taken action if they 
had known. 22 
This example also points out the importance of the concept of time as a resource.  In many 
Western firms, competitive strategies based on time are well established (Stalk, 1988).  None of the 
case study firms viewed time in the same way as a well-managed firm in the West.  The proclivity 
for responding only to central authority means that most Russian workers and managers place little 
value on responsiveness, the goals of the firm, the shared responsibility of employees, or the 
mechanisms by which unresolved problems are surfaced for managers to address.  In contrast to the 
literature’s treatment of differences in time perspective as a stable national characteristic (Bluedorn, 
2000; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1991; Trompenaars, 1998), we uncovered 
significant differences between the four firms, suggesting that individual firms have great latitude in 
the extent to which they reflect national tendencies.  Our findings also suggest that a firm’s concept 
of time may be influenced by its exposure to the West and by the level of competition in its industry. 
The cultural dynamics described above are summarized in Figure 2.   As the economic 
transition shifted the division of labor between the state and the firm, existing firms were rendered 
functionally incomplete.  Adding the functions of management, finance, strategy, and marketing 
created an imbalance in the demographics of these firms and spawned subcultures with little shared 
sense of the firm as a whole.  Within this context, coordination problems are widespread and their 
solution is essential for effective organizational performance.  The problems of coordination across 
subcultures are influenced by several Russian national characteristics, particularly the tendency to 
dissemble and the concept of time as a resource.  These intra-firm dynamics are also influenced by 
the changes taking place in the economic system that require firm-level economic transitions and by 
increasing levels of market-based competition.  As noted earlier, the dynamics noted below in 
Figure 2 could have been explained simply by reference to the concepts in the organizational culture 
model.  Indeed, consistency and coordination, empowerment, and the presence of a firm-level 
mission all could be discussed with reference to concepts in the model.  But discussing the examples 
only in terms of the concepts in the model would miss the underlying pattern uncovered in the case 
studies and presented in Figure 2.  This pattern is very useful in understanding the culture of 
organizations in Russia. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
These four case studies have grounded our conceptual model in the realities of the Russian 
context and addressed the issues posed in our third research question.  In general, the case studies 
support the idea that the model is a useful starting point for understanding issues of culture and 23 
effectiveness in the Russian context.  Indeed, we could have discussed the dynamics highlighted in 
this section in terms of the model, but doing so would have missed the point that concepts can have 
different meanings in different contexts, even as they have wide applicability across those different 
contexts.  The case studies highlight an interesting distinction between the behaviors that illustrate 
the concepts in the model and are similar to what one might observe in firms in the West and those 
behaviors that illustrate the concepts, but are very different from what one might observe in a firm in 
the West.  This distinction is very helpful because it illustrates that the concepts may travel fairly 
well, helping to account for the quantitative support for the model, but that the specific patterns of 
behavior that exemplify the concepts may vary quite a bit across cultures.  Indeed, this aspect of the 
study provides an interesting example of how a theory can provide a useful framework and point of 
reference for understanding cultural patterns that go far deeper than just the model.   
DISCUSSION 
This study has taken an American model of organization culture and effectiveness and 
applied it to understand the performance of a set of foreign-owned firms operating in Russia.  
Several clear substantive differences have emerged from this research.  The first is the importance of 
flexibility in Russia.  Adaptability proved to be the most useful dimension in the model for 
understanding overall effectiveness.  This finding also makes good intuitive sense given Russia’s 
turbulent and unpredictable environment.  This stands in contrast to a more stable environment like 
the USA, where mission appears to take on a much greater importance. Involvement also appears to 
be important to effectiveness in Russia.  Under communism, competition between groups was 
encouraged, but competition between individuals was discouraged.  As a result, Russians like 
working in groups and are good at it (Vlachoutsicos, 2001). 
Other substantive insights emerged from the case studies.  These provided good support for 
the applicability of the model, but also focused our attention on issues specific to Russia.  The most 
distinctive pattern that we observed was the combination of dynamics, summarized in Figure 2,that 
is driven by the “functionally incomplete” organizational structures inherited from the Communist 
era.  These dynamics appear to be an important feature of the organizational cultures of firms 
operating in transition economies (Newman and Nollen, 1998).  Future research on international 
management and cross-cultural differences should not neglect this important set of issues faced by 
managers in transition economies. 24 
This study speaks to several other issues in the organizational literature.  First, this paper has 
made a modest contribution to the longstanding debate about the wisdom of using theories 
developed in one part of the world to understand organizational phenomena in other parts of the 
world (Adler, 1991; Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991; Boyacigiller et al., 2003).  The paper provides an 
interesting point of reference in that debate.  On one hand, this study illustrates that a model of 
organizational culture developed in the USA can be applied in the Russian context and can be useful 
for predicting differences in effectiveness.  But in addition, the research shows that the model can be 
a useful foundation for understanding differences in the culture-effectiveness relationship across 
cultures.  Differences between national contexts can often be clarified through comparative analysis.  
The use of a general model is helpful, if not essential, to the comparative process. 
The novel combination of qualitative and quantitative methods used in this study will also be 
of interest to organizational researchers.  The study began by using an existing model of 
organizational culture and effectiveness as a starting point for the research.  The first part of the 
study presented a quantitative test of the model and showed that the model was useful in 
understanding effectiveness but that the results were somewhat different from the results for a 
sample of US firms.  The quantitative results were used as probes to inform our research questions 
rather than tools to refute falsifiable hypotheses.  The second part of the study selected four firms for 
in-depth qualitative analysis.  These case studies generated a number of examples that served to 
ground the theoretical concepts in the realities of the Russian context.  The case studies offered 
examples that fit well with the model, but also highlighted themes that were invaluable in 
understanding the realities of the Russian context but were not fully anticipated by the model. 
In contrast to the typical approach of qualitative theory-building followed by quantitative 
theory-testing, this study pursued both methods at the same time and allowed us to move more 
quickly toward our goal of understanding the link between culture and effectiveness in the Russian 
context.  As mentioned earlier, this approach carried several risks.  Until we had established the 
validity of the model in the Russian context, it did not make much sense to plan to use it as a 
framework for interpreting the qualitative data.  This meant that we were continuously comparing 
the findings from the two methods.  For example, when we began to analyze our survey data we also 
continued analyzing our qualitative results to make certain that the model could be a useful frame of 
reference for interpreting the results from both studies.  Had we done the qualitative study first we 
could not have explored the themes that emerged from the quantitative study to the same extent that 25 
we have here.  Had we conducted the qualitative study second, we could not have understood if the 
model had validity and meaning in the Russian context.  It is also worth noting that we use the 
quantitative data as a probe to inform our general research questions, rather than as a tool to refute 
falsifiable hypotheses.  In other words we follow the logic of exploration, rather than the logic of 
verification.    
When it became clear that the quantitative results supported the model, our focus changed.  It 
then made sense to use the qualitative data for several different purposes.  The first purpose was to 
help illustrate the concepts in the model and to ground the findings in the reality of Russian 
organizations.  This step of qualitative elaboration worked quite well, and it helped us to see many 
interesting and unanticipated insights that were hiding behind our quantitative analyses.  But the 
qualitative data also served a second purpose of describing examples that fit well with the concepts 
in the model but illustrated those concepts with behaviors, dynamics, and patterns that were quite 
different from what might be observed in a Western context.  This taught us an important lesson: the 
model may be “valid” in the Russian context, but there may still be much to learn about what the 
constructs actually mean in that context. 
This discovery also taught us a healthy respect for the linkage between theoretical concepts 
and the actual behavioral patterns that exemplify them.  As Denison (1996) noted, the link between 
concepts and behavior can vary greatly among countries.  He cited the example of the meaning 
attached to individuals wearing surgical masks on the streets of Tokyo and Los Angeles.  In Tokyo, 
wearing a surgical mask was portrayed as a form of pro-social behavior by those who had a cold and 
wished to make certain that they did not transmit it to others.  In Los Angeles, wearing a surgical 
mask was a means of protecting one’s self from the dangers of the natural and social environment.  
The concepts of collectivism and self-interest are salient in both contexts, and the same behaviors 
existed in both contexts.  The link between the two, however, is exactly the opposite. 
In an effort to help explain the differences that we observed in effectiveness across 
organizations, the final stage of the qualitative analysis focused on the most distinctive cultural 
pattern that we observed, linking functional incompleteness, sub-cultures, time perspective, and 
coordination to help explain the differences that we observed in effectiveness.  This pattern 
influences many of the concepts and measures in the model but reveals a far more fundamental 
dynamic than we could describe using any single dimension.  Combining these insights enabled us 26 
to both validate the model and to provide a more complete understanding of the dynamics of 




1.  To test for response bias we confirmed that the respondent firm size of 91 was almost 
identical to the population of foreign subsidiaries in Russia with more than 15 employees, 
which averaged 92 employees (Goskomstat, 1998). 
 
2.  We conducted a comparative citation analysis for a 1996 issue of Academy of Management 
Journal, 39(4), which included two single respondent studies; Delery and Doty, cited 75 
times according to the social science citation index and Delaney and Huselid, cited 55 times.  
These single respondent studies compare positively to other studies in the same issue of 
Academy of Management Journal which are cited, on average only 21 times.  Thus, scholars 
appear to see significant value in single-respondent studies. 
 
3.  It is interesting to note that when the six specific effectiveness measures are regressed on our 
general effectiveness measure (overall performance), we find that sales growth, profitability, 
quality of products and services, and employee satisfaction are the significant drivers of 
overall performance in the Russian data.  New product development and market share have 
positive betas, but are not significant.  In the case of the US data, the results are the same 
except that market share is also significant. 
 
4.  These results are also encouraging in that they show that correlated measurement error 
between the independent and dependent measures could not have accounted for all the 
significant results.  If this were the case, we would expect to find all of the variance claimed 
by the first variable entered into the regression equation, thus leaving only one significant 
predictor.  Since all of the equations have more than one significant predictor, this suggests 
that the results are quite robust. 27 
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Table 1 
Factor Analysis of Organizational Culture Measures
1 
 
  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
Involvement      
  Empowerment  .21  .83  .08 .14 
  Team Orientation  .01  .79  .18 .09 
  Capability Development  .10  .75  .12 .31 
      
Consistency      
  Core Values  .89  .11 .05 .23 
  Agreement  .89  .26 .18 .09 
  Coordination & Integration  .83  .17 .24 .26 
       
Adaptability      
  Organizational Learning  .14  .21  .80  .16 
  Customer Focus  .26  .10  .83  .17 
  Creating Change  .16  .07  .80  .36 
        
Mission      
  Vision  .22  .33  .16  .67 
  Goals and Objectives  .00  .06  .27  .84 
  Strategic Directions  .00  .29  .14  .78 
        
Eigenvalue  5.11 1.79 1.18 1.03 
% Variance Explained  42.60  14.91  9.79  8.55 
Alpha (for bold items)  .81  .89  .86  .76 




Culture and Effectiveness Correlations 
 












R u s s i a n   D a t a           
Involvement  .44** .33** .38
♠**  .37** .46** .42** .33** .48** 
    Team    Orientation  .42** .28** .35** .34** .44** .41** .30** .45** 
  Capability Devel.  .38**  .32**  .33** .34** .35** .34** .32** .44** 
    Empowerment .35** .25** .32** .27** .41** .35** .24** .36** 
          
Consistency  .31** .22** .25** .28** .23** .27** .12  .29** 
    Core  Values  .30** .30** .22** .25** .21** .24** .11  .28** 
    Agreement  .24**  .17* .24**  .20* .16* .21* .07  .21** 
    Integration  .29** .20*  .22** .29** .25** .27** .13  .30** 
          
Adaptability  .46** .30** .27** .45** .33** .31** .36** .54** 
    Org.Learning  .40** .30** .24** .39** .28** .26** .33** .49** 
    Customer  Focus  .39** .16*  .24** .40** .29** .24** .31** .47** 
    Creating  Change  .35** .32** .22** .36** .28** .28** .28** .42** 
          
Mission  .20** .30** .45** .26** .38** .37** .27** .39** 
    Vision  .07 .10 .33**  .13 .18*  .19*  .13 .38** 
    Goals  .19*  .30** .31** .19*  .34** .33** .23** .27** 
    Strategy  .26** .38** .48** .34** .45** .41** .33** .40** 
          
US Data          
Involvement  .55** .14  .26** .22*  .73** .54** .42** .42** 
  Team  Orientation  .50**  .07  .22*  .20*  .66**  .49**  .34**  .32** 
  Capability Devel.  .55**  .27**  .32** .26** .70** .55** .46** .43** 
    Empowerment .50** .09  .21*  .17*  .71** .47** .40** .35** 
          
Consistency  .55**  .19*  .26**  .28**  .70**  .58**  .37**  .31** 
  Core Values  .53**  .22*  .26**  .27**  .69**  .53**  .32**  .27** 
    Agreement  .49** .21*  .25** .28** .58** .51** .34** .34** 
    Integration  .49** .09  .20*  .20*  .64** .54** .40** .49** 
          
Adaptability  .51**  .14  .26**  .16  .65**  .50**  .45**  .35** 
  Org.Learning  .45**  .04  .20*  .13  .65**  .44**  .34**  .33** 
    Customer  Focus  .43** .14  .19*  .09  .53** .47** .35** .19** 
    Creating  Change  .48** .18*  .29** .22*  .56** .44** .51** .38** 
          
Mission  .58**  .26**  .38**  .33**  .68**  .51**  .43**  .46** 
    Vision  .57** .18*  .34** .27** .73** .56** .44** .45** 
    Goals  .50** .22*  .33** .35** .56** .40** .33** .33** 
    Strategy  .57** .34** .39** .33** .61** .47** .44** .49** 
1  N = 179 for Russian data, N = 94 for US data. 
** ρ<.005,  * ρ<.05 35 
Table 3 
Regressions of Effectiveness on Organizational Culture Dimensions: Russian Data
1 
Dependent Variables  Independent 












Involvement   .27***   .20*   .21*   .18*   .33****   .29****   .18*  .26*** 
Consistency   .13   .05   .13   .07   .05   .12  -.06  .05 
Adaptability   .30****   .09   .05   .31****   .02   .00   .26***  .34**** 
Mission   .09   .10   .36****  -.01   .22**   .21**   .08  .06 
Firm Size   .08   .14   .06   .11   .10   .18**   .02  .12 
%  Manufacturing  -.03 -.05 -.05 -.11 -.11 -.13  -.02  -.04 
Firm Age   .08   .12   .01   .07   .05   .00   .07  -.07 
Industry 1
2,3  -.03 -.10 -.03 -.17*  -.09 -.14  -.03  -.10 
Industry 2
2,3   .06   .04   .04  -.05   .02   .07    11  -.05 
Industry 3
2,3   .09  -.06   .01   .00  -.00   .02  -.08  -.06 
Industry 4
2,3  -.01 -.06   .09 -.01 -.10   .01  -.03  -.02 
Industry 5




 .10  -.08  -.05  -.02   .03   .05   .01  -.08 
Finland
3   .09  -.12   .09  -.08   .08  -.01  -.01  -.08 
Germany
3    .01 -.15   .02 -.09 -.11 -.08    .05  -.02 
Sweden
3   .04   .02  -.03   .03   .00   .02   .08  -.02 
USA
3    .05 -.13 -.02 -.08 -.00 -.05  -.07  -.01 
Manager 
US/Russian 
 .06  -.09   .13   .01   .05   .03   .01  .05 
F  full  model  4.27**** 2.72**** 4.08**** 4.32**** 4.14**** 4.10****  2.39****  6.18**** 
Full model R
2  .32 .23 .31 .33 .32 .32  .21  .41 
Adjusted R
2  .25 .15 .24 .25 .24 .24  .12  .34 
∆ adjusted R
2  4  .24 .10 .23 .20 .23 .21  .10  .33 
F for ∆ adjusted R
2  12.44**** 4.87****  12.05**** 10.49**** 12.30**** 11.20****  4.62****  20.15**** 
DF  160 160 160 160 160 160  160  160 
**** ρ<.001, ***ρ<.005, **ρ<.01, *ρ<.05;    
1. N = 179; standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are reported.  
2. Industry 1=electrical, industrial, and precision instrument manufacturing; Industry 2=wood, paper, textiles, food, and metal manufacturing; Industry 3= other 
manufacturing; Industry 4=banking, insurance, real estate, advertising, and accounting; Industry 5=wholesale and retail trade. 
3. Industry 6= “other services” and home country “France” are excluded from the regressions so that the model is not over-determined.   
4. “∆ adjusted R
2” shows the amount of additional variance explained by adding the four organizational culture variables as a set to regressions including all 14 
control variables.   36 
 
Table 4 
Regressions of Effectiveness on Organizational Culture Dimensions: USA Data
1,2 
 
Dependent Variables  Independent 












Involvement  0.21  -0.18 -0.10 -0.01  0.52**** 0.13  0.06  0.35*** 
Consistency  0.10  0.07  -0.13  0.21 0.19 0.45**  -0.13  -0.13 
Adaptability  -0.06  -0.13 -0.01 -0.38*  -0.11  -0.02  0.32  -0.21 
Mission 0.38**  0.46**  0.58****  0.47***  0.17  0.04 0.24  0.48**** 
               
F  18.09**** 3.13*  5.90****  5.64****  41.44****  16.36**** 9.21****  13.44**** 
R
2  0.36  0.09 0.16 0.15  0.56  0.34  0.22  0.26 
Adjusted R
2  0.34  0.06 0.13 0.12  0.55  0.318  0.20  0.24 
DF  90  90 90 90  90  90  90  90 
**** ρ<.001, *** ρ<.005, ** ρ<.01, * ρ<.05  
1.  Standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are reported above. 













Ratings of Culture Traits and Effectiveness for Case Study Firms 
 






AGA:  Industrial Gases           
Researcher Low  Low  Low  Low  Low  Low 
GM 2.3  2.7  2.0  2.7  2.3  2.2 
Average 10 
Respondents 
2.6 2.0  2.7 2.0  2.0  2.0 
 
Lift: Elevators        
Researcher Low  High  Medium  Medium Low  Low 
GM 2.7  4.3  3.3  3.0  2.7  2.7 
Average 10 
Respondents 
2.4 4.0  3.6 3.1  2.5  2.4 
 
Alfa Laval: Heat Exchangers      
Researcher High  Low  High  Medium Medium  Medium 
GM 4.0  2.7  4.3  3.3  3.7  3.8 
Average 10 
Respondents 
3.7 2.9  4.0 3.2  3.5  3.9 
 
AssiDoman: Cardboard Boxes       
Researcher Medium  Medium  High  High  High  High 
GM 3.7  3.7  4.3  4.7  4.7  4.6 
Average 10 
respondents 
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Figure 2 






























Items and Indexes for Each Trait 
 
Index Scale  Item 
Involvement  Empowerment   1. Decisions are usually made at the level where the best information is 
available.  
 2. Information is widely shared so that everyone can get the information he or 
she needs when it's needed.  
 3. Everyone believes that he or she can have a positive impact. 
  Team Orientation   4. Working in this organization is like being part of a team.  
 5. This organization relies on horizontal control and coordination to get work 
done, rather than hierarchy. 
 6. Teams are the primary building blocks of this organization. 
 Capability 
Development 
 7. This organization is constantly improving compared with its competitors in 
many dimensions. 
 8. This organization continuous invests in the skills of employees.  
 9. The capability of people in this organization is viewed as an important 
source of competitive advantage. 
Consistency  Core Values  10. The leaders and managers follow the guidelines that they set for the rest of 
the organization. 
11. There is a clear and consistent set of values in this organization that governs 
the way we do business.  
12. This organization has an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us 
right from wrong.  
  Agreement  13. When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve solutions that benefit 
both parties in the disagreement. 
14. It is easy to reach consensus, even on difficult issues.  
15. We often have trouble reaching agreement on key issues.*  
 Coordination  & 
Integration 
16. People from different organizational units still share a common perspective. 
17. It is easy to coordinate projects across functional units in this organization. 
18. There is good alignment of goals across levels of this organization. 
Adaptability  Creating Change  19. This organization is very responsive and changes easily.  
20. This organization responds well to competitors and other changes in the 
business environment.  
21. This organization continually adopts new and improved ways to do work.  
  Customer Focus  22. Customer comments and recommendations often lead to changes in this 
organization. 
23. Customer input directly influences our decisions.  
24. The interests of the final customer often get ignored in our decisions.* 
 Organizational 
Learning 
25. We view failure as an opportunity for learning and improvement.  
26. This organization encourages and rewards those who take risk. 
27. We make certain that we coordinate our actions and efforts between 




28. This organization has long-term purpose and direction.  
29. This organization has a clear mission that gives meaning and direction to 
our work. 
30. This organization has a clear strategy for the future. 
 Goals  & 
Objectives 
31. There is widespread agreement about goals of this organization. 
32. Leaders of this organization set goals that are ambitious, but realistic.  
33. The leadership has clearly stated the objectives we are trying to meet. 
  Vision  34. We have a shared vision of what this organization will be like in the future  
35. Leaders of this organization have a long-term orientation.  
36. Our vision creates excitement and motivation for our employees. 
            *Items in italics are worded negatively in the survey.  Responses are reversed for analytic purposes.  41
Appendix B 
Correlations for Russian Data
1 
 
      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13     14     15        16       17 
1. Adaptability     
2. Consistency   .44**   
3. Involvement   .53**   .34**   
4. Mission   .46**   .30**   .45**   
5. Firm Size  -.03   .00  -.02   .03   
6.  %  Manufacturing-.12 -.07 -.09 -.06   .07  
7. Firm age   .05   .04   .12   .11   .29   .11   
8.   Industry 1
2   .06   .06   .11   .02  -.04   .02  -.05   
9.   Industry 2
2  -.08 -.17 -.01 -.01 -.04   .02 -.05 -.10  
10. Industry 3
2   .03   .02  -.01   .02  -.05   .04   .13  -.12  -.14   
11. Industry 4
2  -.03  -.03   .05   .05   .14   .04   .03  -.12  -.14  -.17*   
12. Industry 5
2  -.08 -.01 -.05 -.12   .04 -.07 -.04 -.14 -.07 -.20**  -.20**   
13.  Canada      .00 -.04   .07 -.07 -.03 -.06 -.11 -.09   .03   .05 -.07   .01  
14. Finland   .04  -.10   .01   .05   .04   .04  -.01   .09   .08  -.02  -.06  -.07  -.14   
15.  Germany  -.08 -.05 -.05   .04   .13 -.05 -.01 -.04 -.03 -.04   .08 -.06 -.15*  -.22**   
16.  Sweden      .03   .05 -.07 -.01 -.04 -.02   .11   .04 -.05 -.08 -.03   .08 -.10 -.15*  -.16*   
17.    USA    -.03   .05 -.01 -.07 -.08   .10 -.03  -.04   .01   .03   .03   .09  -.22**  -.34**  -.36**-.25** 
18.  Manager  -.07 -.12 -.07 -.21**  -.01 -.16*   .07  -.07  -.08   .11   .01  -.10   .03  -.07   .13     .11   -.15 
      US/Russsian 
  
1. N=179 
2. Industry 1=electrical, industrial, and precision instrument manufacturing; Industry 2=wood, paper, textiles, food, and metal manufacturing; Industry 3= other 
manufacturing; Industry 4=banking, insurance, real estate, advertising, and accounting; Industry 5=wholesale and retail trade. 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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